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The Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) 
have a common external tariff that is unusually low with the exception of selected products 
such  as  alcohol  and  tobacco.    As  exporters  of  oil and  gas  and  importers  of  agricultural 
products,  the  GCC  is  interested  in  the  impacts  of  tariffs  reductions  in  these  products 
following the eventual completion of the Doha round. Of particular interest are four sectors 
(raw materials, gas-related goods, fisheries and chemicals), in which it is hoped tariffs will be 
eliminated. This will improve market access for the GCC countries, but it may also increase 
the competition depending on the initial bilateral tariffs.  In agriculture, rising import prices 
driven  by  policy  changes  occurring  elsewhere  will  increase  import  costs  in  the  GCC 




                                                         
1 Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra and Trade 
Negotiations and Commercial Diplomacy Branch, DITC, UNCTAD. Financial support by the Islamic 
Development Bank is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of GCC members, UNCTAD or the IDB secretariat.  
Contact: david.vanzetti@anu.edu.au. 
   2 
1. Introduction 
The current WTO negotiations present opportunities and challenges for GCC countries.
2 The WTO 
work programme, which originally covered agriculture, services and some aspects of TRIPS as part of 
the built-in agenda envisaged at the conclusi on of the Uruguay Round, was extended at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001 to include non -agricultural market access and 
several other areas. While some areas, such as trade and investment and government procurement, 
were subsequently  excluded from the agenda for the negotiations, the current negotiations are 
extensive and could have consequences for the GCC countries, both as importers and exporters. 
 
Prospects for further liberalisation  
As  the  global  financial  crisis  continues,  there  will  be  pressures  for  countries  to  use  protectionist 
measures to protect local industries, reducing the likelihood of a negotiated outcome. However, the 
need for a successful and development enhancing conclusion to the Doha Round is greater than ever. 
The WTO itself is confident that an outcome will be attained within the next two years. At present, 
the modalities for an agreement, specifying tariff cuts and exemptions, seem almost to be agreed. Not 
yet specified are details such as which products will be selected as exempt, and the precise treatment 
of these products. Nonetheless, although the final outcome is as yet unknown, if there is an agreement 
any time soon it is not likely to look very different from what is currently (June 2009) on the table, so 
an analysis of potential impacts on  the GCC countries is  timely.
3 One area of uncertainty in the 
negotiations relates to the elimination of tariffs in specific sectors of interest to developing countries. 
In this paper, attention is given to four sectors of interest to GCC exporters. 
 
A short summary 
GCC countries are importers of agricultural products. In general, their applied tariffs are very low 
with  a  relatively  high  binding  overhang.  This  means  the  proposed  tariff  reductions  in  bound 
agricultural tariffs will reduce their flexibility to increase tariffs but will not oblige these countries to 
open their markets any further with minor exceptions (figure 1). As net importers, they will benefit 
only marginally from the opening of markets in other countries. Agricultural exports are estimated to 
increase by ten per cent off a low base. However, the general rise in world prices accompanying 
liberalization  will  require  GCC  countries  to  pay  more  for  imports  of  temperate  products  such  as 
wheat, sugar and dairy products. Tariff revenue losses on processed tobacco products, a major import 
covered under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, are estimated to be significant.  The resulting 
annual welfare losses are estimated to amount to $143 million for the GCC group as a whole. From 
this  perspective,  the  GCC  would  be  favoured  by  a  less  ambitious  outcome  to  the  WTO  Doha 
agriculture negotiations that led to lower increases in world prices. 
                                                         
2 The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.   3 


















In  the  industrial  sector,  GCC  bound  tariffs  also  exceed  applied  tariffs.  Even  the  more  ambitious 
NAMA proposal would have almost no impact on GCC applied tariffs (figure 2). 
  


















                                                                                                                                                                               
3 Since nothing is agreed until everything is agreed the outcome could be very different in which case it is 
difficult to decide which proposal to analyse. However, many analysts argue that either an agreement is similar 
to the latest drafts or negotiations would have to start almost from the beginning.     4 
Tariffs on GCC exports, dominated by oil and oil-based products, are comparatively low, as few 
countries attempt to keep out energy products.  Thus, there is some, but only limited, scope to benefit 
from improved market access.  
 
Within the specific sectors, chemicals, fish, gas-related goods and raw materials, GCC countries face 
taxes averaging only 1.6 per cent on their exports. This reflects the low tariffs, 1.4 per cent, on raw 
materials, which contributes to the bulk of exports.  
 
The elimination of global tariffs within these specific sectors has mixed benefits for GCC exporters. 
Estimated export revenue gains for the specific sectors amount $1,086 million for chemicals, $2,201 
million  for  gas-related  goods  and  $870 million  for  raw  materials.  The  estimated  increase  in  fish 
exports is a modest $20 million. 
 
GCC  countries  have  already  undertaken  substantial  autonomous  liberalization,  including  the 
formation of a customs union within the region. Therefore, in contrast to agriculture, GCC countries 
would  most  likely  be  favoured  by  the  more  ambitious  proposals  on  the  table  in  the  NAMA 
negotiations.  Losses  incurred  in  specific  sectors  are  relatively  small,  and  additional  growth 
engendered by an ambitious Doha outcome would most likely benefit all countries. 
 
The analysis undertaken here does not examine domestic policies within the GCC countries, such as 
domestic  support  to  agriculture,  nor  is  there  any  attempt  to  look  at  macroeconomic  issues.  Only 
publically available data, from UNCTAD, WTO and FAO, have been used for the analysis. 
 
Outline  
The outline of this report is as follows. In section 2, we review the state of play in the negotiations on 
agriculture and industrial tariffs. Next, we look at the existing border measures and identify what is 
left to negotiate. Within the Doha Round agricultural and industrial (NAMA) tariffs are negotiated 
separately,  although  the  outcome  of  one  impinges  on  the  other.  We  specify  likely  scenarios  for 
agricultural  and  industrial  bound  tariffs  and  calculate  the  resulting  changes  in  applied  tariffs.  In 
section 4 we use the ATPSM agricultural trade model to quantify the effects of liberalisation on the 
GCC agricultural sector. In section 5 we look at industrial tariffs. The key trade-off in the negotiations 
is  the  level  of  ambition  versus  the  necessary  flexibility  to  protect  politically  sensitive  industries. 
Rather than sticking to an agreed formula with no exemptions, history has shown that some flexibility 
is politically necessary. However, too many exemptions may undermine the level of ambition. To 
examine this trade-off three NAMA scenarios are compared. These portray a surprisingly  narrow 
range of outcomes, with little difference between the three. In addition, the impact of eliminating 
tariffs in specific sectors is examined. Using GSIM, an Armington style bilateral trade modelling   5 
framework, we attempt to quantify the resulting tariff changes and their economic impact in the four 
sectors.
4 Finally, we draw implications for government policy in GCC countries.  
 
2. The State of Play in the Negotiations 
The  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  in  1995  included  a  clause  to  commence  negotiations  on  further 
liberalisation. The Doha Declaration included a commitment to a so-called single undertaking, by 
which nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Agriculture and industrial tariffs are negotiated 
separately, as are several other issues, but they are not independent. The outcome for industrial tariffs 




(i)  Agriculture 
Many  observers  were  surprised  when  the  ongoing  Doha  Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
collapsed in July 2008. In the contentious negotiations, according to WTO Director General Pascal 
Lamy, 18 of the 20 major agenda items had been agreed, and the tariff cuts on the table, which would 
lead to reductions in agricultural bound tariffs between 33 and 70 per cent, seemed substantial. It 
appeared little could be gained by negotiating further. The obstacle seemed to be safeguard measures 
to control import surges, with China and India asking for flexible safeguards, and the USA insisting 
that such measures be limited. The final unresolved issue relates to domestic support for US cotton 
producers. This is a long-running concern, particularly for several West African cotton producing 
countries.   
 
Nonetheless, negotiators have made significant progress since the previous suspension of the Round 
in 2006. The specific thresholds and tariff reductions have generally been agreed, as has the approach 
to the selection and broad treatment of exemptions for sensitive and special products. Details are 
contained in the Chairman‟s Draft Modalities Text (WTO 2008a). They agreed that tariff reductions 
shall be linear cuts within four bands, with the higher tariffs attracting greater reductions. Developed 
and  developing  country  groups,  such  as  the  GCC,  would  have  different  thresholds  and  linear 
reductions, plus there would be differentiated treatment for various groups such as LDCs, recently 
acceded countries and small and vulnerable economies. The four bands suggested by the Chairman‟s 
draft (WTO 2008a) have thresholds of 20, 50 and 75 per cent for developed countries and 30, 80 and 
130 per cent for developing countries. Within the four bands for developed countries, the respective 
average linear cuts would be 50, 57, 64 and 75 per cent, with a cap of 100 per cent on the final tariff. 
Within  the  four  bands  for  developing  countries  the  respective  cuts  would  be  two  thirds  in  the 
                                                         
4 It would be preferable to use a fully specified general equilibrium model such as GTAP for such analysis, but 
data limitations do not allow this. 
5 A more comprehensive discussion of the negotiations can be found in UNCTAD (2008).   6 
respective bands with a cap at 150 per cent, notwithstanding that the bands have different thresholds. 
Least developed countries would be exempt from reduction commitments.  
 
Sensitive products will not be totally exempt from tariff reductions, and countries that make use of 
such exemptions will normally be required to provide additional access in some alternative fashion 
such as increasing the import or tariff rate quota where these exist. A formula for increasing the quota 
as compensation for a lesser tariff reduction has been discussed but it is not clear how this would 
work. Sensitive products are exempt from tariff capping.  
 
Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Qatar  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  would  undertake  the  "normal"  developing 
country cuts. Oman as a recently acceded member would benefit from a moderation of cuts of 8 
percentage points and would be allowed to keep tariffs at or below 10 per cent unchanged. Saudi 
Arabia as a very recently acceded member is not required to undertake reductions. 
 
Table 1: Chairman's proposal for reduction of agricultural tariffs (December 2008) 
Developed countries  Developing countries  Recently Acceded 
Members (RAMs) 










 75  70%   130%  46.7   130%  38.7   130%  36.7 
75% ≥ X > 
50%  64%  130% ≥ X > 80%  42.7  130% ≥ X > 80%  34.7  130% ≥ X > 
80%  32.7 
50% ≥ X > 
20%  57%  80% ≥ X > 30%  38.0  80% ≥ X > 30%  30.0  80% ≥ X > 30%  28.0 
20% ≥ X > 0  50%  30% ≥ X > 0  33.3  30% ≥ X > 0  25.3  30% ≥ X > 0  23.3 
Implementation: 6 equal 
instalments over 5 years 
Overall average reduction: 
minimum 54% 
Implementation: 11 equal 
instalments over 10 years 




Flexibility to exempt 
tariffs below 10% from 
reduction 
Alternative option: average 
cut of 24 per cent. 
  Source: WTO (2008a) 
 
The proposed tariff cuts tend to overstate the impact because of the gap in GCC countries between 
bound tariff rates, which are negotiated with the WTO, and the rates  actually  applied. For many 
countries the reductions in bound rates would only minimally affect the applied rates, and there would 
be little or no direct economic impact. The major effect of the Round would be to squeeze water out 
of the tariff, or more technically, remove the binding overhang. However, the flexibility to unilaterally 
increase  applied  rates  would  be  reduced.  The  binding  overhang  in  developed  countries  is  much 
smaller,  and  changes  in  tariffs  in  the  European  Union  and  Japan  could  provide  opportunities  to 
developing  country  exporters  not  benefiting  from  preferential  access.  However,  the  scope  for 
increased imports is limited somewhat by the exemptions for sensitive products. 
 
 (ii) The industrial tariff negotiations 
In November 2001, WTO Ministers agreed, in the part of the Ministerial Declaration relating to non-
agricultural market access, "by modalities to be agreed, to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs,   7 
including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-
tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries. Product coverage 
shall be comprehensive and without a priori exclusions" (paragraph 16 Doha Ministerial Declaration). 
Full account was to be taken of the special needs and interests of developing and least-developed 
country  participants,  "including  through  less  than  full  reciprocity  in  reduction  commitments,  in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994…"
6 
 
The significance of the agreement was that the negotiations were to tackle some serious problems 
facing developing countries in their trade: tariffs, including tariff peaks, which are biased against their 
trade,  and  tariff  escalation  that  hinders  their  attempts  to  industrialise.  This  lead  ultimately  to  the 
acceptance of the harmonising Swiss formula, by which high tariffs are reduced proportionately more 
than lower tariffs. 
 
Elements for negotiation 
The WTO General Council reached an important decision on the Doha Work Programme on August 
1, 2004. This "July Package" (Annex B of WTO Document WT/L/579 of August 2, 2004) provides 
the basis for negotiations on non-agricultural market access. Points for discussion included: 
 
1.  Elements for decisions on a formula for tariff reductions. 
2.  Provisions for increasing binding coverage and setting the level of newly bound tariff rates.
7  
3.  Sectoral elimination of tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries.  
4.  Supplementary modalities ("zero-for-zero," sectoral harmonization, and request and offer).
8  
5.  The possible elimination of low duties.  
6.  Provisions for exemption from tariff cuts by least developed countries (LDCs).  
7.  Special provisions to take account of commitments by recently acceded countries (RAMs).  
                                                         
6 No overall target was fixed, unlike in some earlier rounds of negotiations in the GATT. For example, from the 
outset it was agreed that industrial tariffs would be cut by one third in the Kennedy Round, while in the Uruguay 
Round it was agreed that developed countries would cut tariffs by 36 per cent and developing countries by 24 
per cent.  
7 In WTO negotiations on trade in goods, members commit to “binding” tariffs and lowering already bound 
tariffs. This involves each member listing commitments in a schedule of concessions. Increasing such bound 
tariff rates requires renegotiating schedules under GATT Article XXVIII and offering other tariff reductions to 
principal suppliers. 
8 “Zero for zero” refers to an agreement by a critical mass of key importers and exporters to eliminate duties on 
selected products, with zero rates then being made available to other participants in the negotiations under the 
most favoured nation (MFN) principle, but without requiring any commitment on their part. “Sectoral 
elimination,” as discussed the Doha Work Programme, refers to agreement by all participants in negotiations to 
eliminate duties on selected products. Developing countries have argued that should such a modality be agreed, 
their participation should be voluntary. “Request and offer” refers to bilateral agreements on selected tariff rates 
that would apply to other participants in negotiations under the MFN principle.   8 
8.  The  need  to  take  account  of  challenges  faced  by  nonreciprocal  preference  beneficiaries  and 
countries that are highly dependent on tariff revenues.  
Points 6 (LDCs) and 8 (preference beneficiaries and tariff revenues) are not directly relevant to GCC 
countries, although countries to which they export may be affected. The remaining factors are directly 
applicable. 
 
The current proposal 
The basis of the current proposal, as specified in the NAMA Chairman‟s Draft (WTO 2008b) is the 
harmonising Swiss formula of the earlier Tokyo Round. The formula implicitly specifies a maximum 
tariff, and this would differ between developed and developing countries, with developing countries 
having a higher maximum. The Chairman‟s Draft proposes a coefficient (maximum tariff) of 8 per 
cent for developed countries and 20, 22 or 25 per cent for developing countries, depending on the 
non-use or lesser use of flexibilities (exemptions) allowed for a limited number of tariff lines with 
some additional conditions. The more tariff lines that are exempted or receive lower cuts the deeper 
are the cuts for the remaining lines (i.e. the smaller is the Swiss coefficient).   
 
The possibility of eliminating or harmonizing tariffs, voluntarily or otherwise, in particular in sectors 
of export interest to developing countries among a critical mass approach is also under discussion, but 
as yet unresolved. A participation rule for developing countries is highly controversial.   
 
As  in  agriculture,  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Qatar  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  would  undertake  the 
"normal" developing country cuts. It is proposed that Oman shall not be required to reduce any bound 
rates  below  5  per  cent  after  applying  tariff  cuts  with  a  Swiss  coefficient  of  22.  The  use  of  the 
flexibilities  would  be  limited  (Paragraph  7  (g)).  Saudi  Arabia  would  be  exempt  from  reduction 
commitments.  
 
3. Existing patterns of tariffs and other interventions  
The six GCC countries have revised their applied tariff rates in recent years and  have in 2008 a 
common external tariff at the HS 8-digit level for almost all products. Almost 10 per cent of applied 
tariff rates are zero and almost all the rest are 5 per cent. Only about 1 per cent of tariff lines have 
different values, mostly 100 per cent as in the case of tobacco. Some imports are prohibited.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of 2008 GCC applied tariffs 
  Agriculture  NAMA 
Tariff  %  % 
0 per cent  21.6  7.1 
5 per cent  74.0  92.6 
Other  4.4  0.3 
Source: Calculated by UNCTAD from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). 
   9 
There are some exceptions to the common external tariff. For example meat of swine (02031100) has 
an applied rate of 5 per cent in Bahrain and UAE and a rate of 100 per cent in Oman. No tariff is 
available in the case of Kuwait and imports are prohibited in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Differences also 
exist on alcohol products. Beer, for example, has a tariff of 50 per cent in UAE, 100 per cent in Oman 
and Qatar, 125 per cent in Bahrain and is prohibited in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  
 
A few  inconsistencies  seem to exist between applied and bound rates.  In  a few  cases  Oman has 
different bound rates for a single 6-digit product (using an extension, otherwise tariffs are bound at the 
6-digit level). In some cases in their 2008 applied rates, however, only one tariff line for that 6-digit 
product exists. In some cases one of the bound rates is below the applied rate. For example 391721 
(tubes, pipes and hoses, and fittings) has a bound rate of 0 per cent for the extension 01 (for civil 
aircraft) and 6.5 per cent for the extension 02 (other). The applied rate is 5 per cent. Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman,  Qatar  and  UAE  did  not  foresee  the  prohibition  of  imports  in  their  commitment  schedule 
(bound rates). Yet the 2008 applied rates indicate the import prohibition of certain sensitive goods 
such as pork and opium. Saudi Arabia has prohibition of some items in its schedule. Bahrain has 
bound cigars and cigarettes at 35 per cent. The 2008 applied rate, however, is 100 per cent (with a 
minimum charge per unit). Likewise, Oman and Qatar have bound some products such as alcoholic 
beverages at 15 per cent but seem to apply 100 per cent.  
 
Agricultural tariffs 
GCC countries provide only limited border support to their agriculture sectors, generally lower than 
developing countries as a whole. The average applied tariffs in GCC countries, shown in table  3, 
range from 4.9 per cent (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) to 9.4 per cent (Oman). Average bound tariffs are 
about four times the applied average, providing scope for reductions in bound rates with little impact 
on current applied rates. 
 
Table 3 Simple average agricultural tariffs on GCC imports 
  Bound  Applied 
  %  % 
Bahrain  38.9  7.1 
Kuwait  100.0  4.9 
Oman  28.0  9.4 
Qatar  25.7  6.7 
Saudi Arabia  20.0  4.9 
United Arab Emirates  25.4  6.1 
Source: WTO/ITC/UNCTAD World Tariff Profile database.  
 
Industrial tariffs  
The most recent data show relatively low average applied tariffs of 4.7 per cent in GCC for industrial 
products (table 4). The average for applied tariffs is below bound rates, with a lower binding overhang   10 
in Oman and Saudi Arabia, two recently acceded members of the WTO. This implies that large cuts in 
bound rates can be made with little or no affect on applied rates, although this doesn‟t apply for every 
tariff line. 
 
Table 4 Simple average industrial tariffs on GCC imports 
  Bound  Applied 
  %  % 
     
Bahrain  33.6  4.7 
Kuwait  100.0  4.7 
Oman  11.6  4.7 
Qatar  14.5  4.7 
Saudi Arabia  10.5  4.7 
United Arab Emirates  13.1  4.7 
Source: Calculated by UNCTAD from WITS and WTO/ITC/UNCTAD World Tariff Profile 
database. Average includes zero tariffs, but tariff lines with missing values are excluded. 
 
4. Estimating potential impacts of the WTO proposals on agriculture 
The agriculture proposal is described and analysed in this section. Industrial tariffs reductions are 
assessed in the following section. The likely outcome in the agricultural sector, as outlined in WTO 
(2008a), is detailed in table 5. The tariff thresholds and cuts are as shown.  
 
 Table 5 The agricultural proposal 
Scenario  Label  Description 




Developed:  If initial tariff >75, 70%;  
if >50 and ≤75, 63%; 
if >20 and ≤50, 57%; 
if ≤20, 50%. 
 
Developing: If initial tariff >130, 47%;  
if >80 and ≤130, 43%; 
if >30 and ≤80, 38%; 
if ≤30, 33%. 
i.e. developing country cuts two thirds of developed countries 




Sensitive products: One third of formula cuts on 4% of tariff 
lines for developed countries. TRQ expanded to 5% of 
domestic consumption. Two third of formula cuts on 
2.67% of tariff lines and no expansion of TRQ for 
developing countries. Sensitive products ranked and 
chosen according to potential loss in tariff revenue. 
 
Special products for developing countries: No tariff cuts on 
cereals plus other imports (selected according to potential 
tariff revenue loss) accounting for 12% of tariff lines.   11 
 
Export subsidies: to be eliminated. 
 
Domestic support:  
EU 80% reduction, USA and Japan 70% and others 55% 
reduction.  
 
Source: Based on WTO (2008a). 
 
A  less  transparent  issue  relates  to  the  selection  and  treatment  of  sensitive  and  special  products. 
Countries may designate their own sensitive products, so at this point it is not possible to know which 
products are to be selected. The approach used here for sensitive products is to rank each country‟s 
tariffs according to the potential loss in tariff revenue and select the highest for exemption. This takes 
into  account  changes  in  applied  tariffs  plus  the  trade  flows  on  those  tariff  lines.  In  reality,  this 
selection is somewhat arbitrary and some countries may not choose these products. 
 
Once selected, the treatment of sensitive products is as follows. One third of the formula cuts would 
apply to these tariffs in developed countries (with TRQs expansion) and two-third of the formula cuts 
in developing countries (without TRQ expansion).
9 This implies that if an import with an initial tariff 
of 100 were selected, the required developing country tariff cut would be two thirds of 43 per cent, i.e. 
28 per cent. For special products, available to developing countries only, the cereals were selected as 
exempt from any tariff reduction since their designation shall be guided by indicators based on the 
criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. Cereals account for 2.3 per cent of 
tariff lines. An additional 9.7 per cent of tariff lines could be chosen as special products, taking the 
total to 12 per cent. To achieve an overall average cut of 11 per cent for special products  the 9.7 per 
cent non-cereals are reduced by 13.6 per cent.  
 
Estimated changes in intervention 
The economic impact of tariff liberalisation depends upon changes in applied rates, as distinct from 
the bound rates that are the subject of the negotiations. The changes in the applied rates for agriculture 
following the proposed scenario are shown in table 6 for individual GCC countries.  
 
Average  tariffs  are  reduced  between  18  and  25  per  cent,  with  the  larger  tariffs  in  Kuwait  being 
reduced the most. The reduction in average tariff in Oman is relatively slight because of the special 
provision that apply to this country. Saudi Arabia is not required to make tariff cuts as a very recently 
acceded member. 
                                                         
9 Paragraph 78(a) of the draft text allows developing countries the option of taking only half of the entitlement 
of 5.33 per cent of tariff lines as sensitive products and to not increase or create TRQs for those products. 
Although this option allows developing countries only to deviate by one-third from formula cuts (instead of 
two-third maximum deviation as in the case for developed countries) the option to not introduce or increase 
TRQs has been welcomed by developing countries and has therefore been chosen here.    12 
 
Table 6 Bound tariffs. Initial and final trade weighted agricultural tariffs  
  Initial  Final 
  %  % 
Region     
Bahrain  57.1  47.0 
Kuwait  100.0  74.5 
Oman  21.8  18.1 
Qatar  34.9  27.6 
Saudi Arabia  42.6  42.6 
United Arab Emirates  36.6  27.5 
Source: Simulations. As a very recently acceded member, Saudi Arabia is 
not required to undertake cuts in tariffs. 
 
 
Initial  and  final  average  applied  tariffs  are  shown  in  table  7.  The  changes  are  slight,  almost 
imperceptible  at  this  level  of  aggregation.  For  no  country  is  there  a  change  greater  than  one 
percentage point.  
 
Table 7 Applied tariffs. Initial and final agriculture tariffs 
  Initial  Final 
  %  % 
Region     
Bahrain  22.5  22.1 
Kuwait  6.3  6.3 
Oman  8.8  8.8 
Qatar  12.7  12.7 
Saudi Arabia  7.3  7.3 
United Arab Emirates  11.4  11.4 
Source: Simulations. Tariffs are trade weighted. 
 
There are 1122 tariff lines at the tariff line level in agriculture. For Bahrain, for example, 22 of these 
applied tariffs are reduced by the proposed changes in bound rates. The numbers for the five other 
GCC countries, shown in table 8, are less. As a result the likely impact on tariff revenues in the 
agricultural sector, assuming no change in imports, is minimal. 
 
Table 8 Potential impacts in tariff revenue in agricultural sector 






  No.  $m  $m 
Region       
Bahrain  22  70  -1 
Kuwait  20  108  -7 
Oman  2  93  -0 
Qatar  5  55  -1 
Saudi Arabia  0   685  0 
United Arab Emirates  0  545  0 
Source: Simulations.  
   13 
Sectoral impact in agriculture 
However, the averages hide greater changes in particular sectors. Almost all the items with high tariffs 
are in HS Chapter 24, tobacco and related products. Of greatest, indeed outstanding significance for 
tariff revenues, are imports of cigarettes into Bahrain and Kuwait. In Bahrain, with imports amounting 
to $29.6 million, the 35 per cent applied tariff would be reduced to 30 per cent and the 100 per cent 
rate reduced to 86 per cent. This assumes that these products are selected as special products with 
reduction  of  13.6  per  cent  rather  than  those  special  products  without  any  reductions  or  products 
receiving full or moderated formula cuts. In Kuwait, with imports of $54 million, the current bound 
and applied tariff is 100 per cent and would be reduced to 86 per cent.  
 
Other products where tariff revenue is affected  in Bahrain are ethyl alcohol and other spirits and 
wines.  Likewise,  for  Qatar  the  most  significant  import  affected  by  the  proposed  reductions  is 
alcoholic beverages such as spirits, fermented beverages and vodka.  A detailed list identifying all 
products where applied rates are affected at the disaggregated GCC CET tariff line level is attached as 
an Excel file.  
 
The exact impact on the applied rates, however, depends on the selection of  special and sensitive 
products where countries have flexibility. If products other than cereals would have been selected, the 
implication for applied rates and for the tariff revenue would be different. The somewhat critical HS 
Chapter 24, tobacco and related products, accounts for 1.8 per cent of GCC's applied agricultural tariff 
lines. Up to 5 per cent of tariff lines could be designated as special products without any cuts. Thus, if 
tobacco products as well as the few other products where applied rates are affected would be selected 
as those special products there would be no any impact on the tariff revenue. However, since the 
selection  of  special  products  shall  be  guided  by  indicators  based  on  criteria  of  food  security, 
livelihood security and rural development, it is questionable whether tobacco products not produced 
in GCC could be selected as special products. If not, the products could be selected as sensitive but 
the impact on tariff revenue and the final applied rate would be higher. On the other hand, a fall in 
tariffs would lead to an increase in imports, offsetting the tariff cuts to some extent but undermining 
the intention of the tariffs.   
 
Because of the large gap between bound and applied rates for most agricultural items in the GCC, the 
impact  of  the  WTO  proposal  on  GCC  imports  would  be  slight.  Trade  liberalisation  provides 
opportunities for exporters to enhance their exports. In the case of the GCC, agricultural exports are 
minimal so this effect is negligible. More important, however, is the impact of rising world prices on 
GCC agricultural imports. World prices rise because producer support, via tariffs, export subsidies 
and domestic support, is reduced in many countries, in particular, the European Union and Japan. 
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Modelling changes in trade policy 
To assess the impact of rising world prices on the GCC we use ATPSM, a static global agricultural 
trade model jointly developed by UNCTAD and FAO. The model distinguishes between bound and 
applied tariffs and includes tariff rate quotas (where the tariff rate depends on whether imports exceed 
a specified quota), two important features of the post Uruguay Round tariff structure. The model 
results are driven by changes in policy variables (tariffs, export subsidies, domestic support and tariff 
rate quotas) which determine changes in domestic prices, consumption and production. This in turn 
leads to a change in imports and exports, which feed into world prices. The model solves by finding a 
set of world prices that equate global imports and exports. Intersectoral effects are captured through 
cross-elasticities, but there are no constraints on the use of resources such as capital, labour or water. 
Nor is there account of changes in stocks. Imports are assumed to be homogeneous, with consumers 
and importers indifferent to the source of their products.
10 The results indicate the effects of the policy 
changes assuming a constant base, 2002 -2004. There is no account of exogenous growth over the 
implementation  period.  The  model  is  well -documented  (Peters  and  Vanzetti  2004)  and  is 
downloadable from the UNCTAD website.
11 One limitation is the model commodity coverage, shown 
later in table 10, which does not include all the products covered by the Agreement on Agriculture. 
For example, wool is not included.  
 
Price and production data are an average of 2002 to 2004 and are compile d from FAO statistics.
12 
Elasticities are from FAO's World Food Model. These are based on a trawling of the literature and are 
not econometrically estimated specifically for the model. Some of the elasticities were modified by 
UNCTAD to reflect homogeneity, symmetry and other conditions. The WTO/ITC/UNCTAD World 
Tariff Profile database is the source of information on applied and bound tariffs. Applied rates are 
2006 or 2007 data and bound rates  are the final Uruguay Round rates. Data can be accessed through 
the WITS software. 
 
The standard ATPSM does not contain data for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. For this application 
production and trade quantity data were obtained from FAO (FAOSTAT) and refer to 2006. For 
consistency, data for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United  Arab Emirates were updated from the same 
source. Supply and demand elasticities for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar were unavailable and thus set 
equal to those from Kuwait, a similar country.  
 
Simulation results for agriculture 
                                                         
10 An Armington approach is used on the demand side to differentiate domestic and foreign products, but there 
is no differentiation between imports from different sources. 
11 The standard version of ATPSM is downloadable from www.unctad.org/tab.  
12 World prices for many commodities rose sharply in 2007 and 2008, and then fell in 2009. By not taking more 
recent data into account, the modelling underestimates the positive and negative impacts.   15 
The WTO agricultural proposal, as described earlier in table 5, leads to an increase in world prices of 
agricultural  products.  Because  GCC  tariffs  are  virtually  unchanged,  these  price  changes  push  up 
domestic prices within the GCC, to the detriment of consumers and the benefit of producers. Where 
tariffs are reduced further than the rise in world prices, domestic prices will fall, with the opposite 
effects on producers and consumers.  The changes in world prices leave agricultural importers such as 
the GCC countries worse off as a result. GCC imports, at around $17.5 billion in the base period, 
greatly exceed exports, $1.2 billion. The slight increase in the cost of imports, less than half a per 
cent, hides a fall in the quantity of imports and reflects a 5 per cent increase in the prices of traded 
agricultural goods. Export revenues rise because price and quantity are both increasing.  
 
Government (tariff) revenue may rise or fall depending on the responsiveness of consumers to a fall in 
the  price  of  imports.  A  tariff  reduction  may  lead  to  an  increase  in  revenue  if  imports  increase 
sufficiently. The fall in the tariff on processed tobacco (i.e. cigarettes) and some beverages is the most 
significant factor reducing the overall revenue for Kuwait and Oman (table 9).  
 
While the  goal of market access negotiations appears to be the increase  in exports, by itself this 
measure does not take into account the additional costs of producing the increase in exports. A more 
complete measure of the gains to the sector is welfare, defined here as the change in consumer and 
producer  surplus  plus  government  revenue.  The  welfare  changes  are  negative  because  the 
predominant effect is a  rise in  import prices which are detrimental  to consumers  and  do little to 
benefits the relatively few agricultural producers. In addition, there are no gains from a more efficient 
allocation of resources, because distortionary tariffs, already quite low, are not reduced.  
 
Table 9 Potential impacts of WTO agricultural proposal on trade and welfare in GCC members 
Country  Export 
revenue 
Import cost  Government 
revenue 
Welfare 
  $m  $m  $m  $m 
         
Bahrain  0.32  9.34  0.51  -19.66 
Kuwait  1.44  -0.03  -9.13  -8.46 
Oman  5.57  -3.84  -6.96  -16.59 
Qatar  0.35  2.80  0.55  -7.69 
Saudi Arabia  74.21  15.12  1.02  -40.49 
U. A. Emirates  40.33  38.93  6.78  -50.03 
GCC  122.22  62.32  -7.23  -142.92 
Source: ATPSM simulations.  
 
The sectoral effects are shown in table 10. The largest price increases, driven by changes in EU and 
Japanese policies, are in wheat, sugar and livestock products. The largest exports are refined sugar, 
cheese, livestock, vegetables and tea, mainly from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, but the 
export revenue gains are concentrated in wheat, sugar and cheese. The top five imports are processed   16 
tobacco, poultry meat, livestock, barley and refined sugar. The major importer is the United Arab 
Emirates and the major import into the region is processed tobacco. At $10 billion, this accounts for 
more than half of the total GCC agricultural imports. The major sectors contributing to the increase in 
the cost of imports are refined sugar ($33 million), cheese ($23 million), barley ($14 million) and 
maize ($11 million). There are also falls in imports in some sectors, namely livestock ($18 million), 
sheep meat ($20 million) and tomatoes ($15 million). 
 
Table 10 Potential impacts of WTO agricultural proposal on world prices and welfare in GCC 




Import cost  Government 
revenue 
Welfare 
  %  $m  $m  $m  $m 
           
Livestock  0.73  1.68  -17.96  -0.99  -5.75 
Bovine meat  3.90  1.06  2.45  0.17  -14.44 
Sheepmeat  5.32  1.15  -19.58  -1.37  -15.50 
Pigmeat  2.71  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.08 
Poultry  -3.65  -3.34  6.64  -0.10  44.66 
Milk, conc.  5.23  1.00  4.10  0.29  -5.92 
Butter  8.39  1.13  3.43  0.31  -7.71 
Cheese  7.53  20.22  23.37  2.09  -18.39 
Hides & skins  1.95  1.16  0.11  0.02  -0.03 
Wheat  14.80  35.67  3.76  3.11  -22.65 
Rice  2.09  0.29  5.96  0.37  -9.39 
Barley  2.38  0.04  14.48  0.09  -15.86 
Maize  6.98  0.16  11.30  0.33  -13.99 
Sorghum  1.24  0.09  -0.02  0.00  -0.01 
Sugar, raw  2.15  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sugar, refined  7.02  26.76  32.87  4.28  -18.70 
Coffee, green  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.04 
Coffee, proc.  1.91  0.43  0.96  0.13  -1.43 
Cocoa beans  -0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cocoa, proc.  2.23  0.00  0.08  0.01  -0.19 
Tobacco leaves  2.72  0.08  0.69  1.14  -2.86 
Tobacco, proc.  0.00  0.00  0.00  -16.95  -4.23 
Oilseeds, temp.  3.84  0.23  3.95  0.56  -8.26 
Oilseeds, trop.  0.27  0.00  0.08  0.01  -0.16 
Vegetable oils  1.60  2.44  4.16  0.48  -3.64 
Pulses  0.87  0.06  1.11  0.13  -1.67 
Tomatoes  1.53  0.13  -15.07  -1.07  -7.18 
Roots & tubers  1.58  0.19  -0.50  -0.02  -0.03 
Apples  3.45  0.37  1.04  0.10  -5.83 
Citrus fruits  2.53  1.98  -2.93  -0.12  -0.15 
Bananas  0.86  0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -1.10 
Other tropical fruits  1.20  28.14  -4.46  -0.48  -0.39 
Tea  1.45  1.03  2.03  0.24  -1.70 
Rubber  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cotton  1.41  0.05  0.22  0.04  -0.30 
Total  5.52  122.22  62.32  -7.23  -143.00 
Source: ATPSM simulations. * Average world price is weighted by base exports. 
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Tariff revenue losses are concentrated, almost exclusively, in the processed tobacco sector, where the 
fall in revenue is estimated at $17 million. Other sectors show small gains or losses. 
 
Temperate  cereals  and  livestock  products  contribute  to  the  overall  welfare  losses.  Bovine  meat, 
sheepmeat,  cheese,  wheat,  barley,  maize  and  sugar  all  contribute  substantially  to  welfare  losses. 
Almost  all  sectors  show  a  loss.  The  exception  is  poultry,  where  a  fall  in  world  prices  benefits 
consumers, particularly those in Saudi Arabia. Poultry is currently lowly protected compared with 
beef and sheepmeat.  
 
With the main effect of a likely Doha outcome for GCC countries being a rise in world prices, it is 
useful to examine import costs by commodity and country. These are shown in table 11. Wheat is the 
key increase in import costs for Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, but Saudi Arabia produces almost all of its 
own wheat and its imports are estimated to fall as producer respond to higher prices.  However, barley 
is  a  major  import  of  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  increased  world  price  is  difficult  to  offset  through 
additional production. For United Arab Emirates, sugar is a major import, but half the 1.3 million 
tonne imports are re-exported. The higher price of sugar inflates the import costs. 
 
As agricultural importers, GCC countries are unlikely to be favoured by the increase in world prices 
that would accompany liberalisation of world agricultural markets. The estimated impacts take into 
account the propensity for consumers to substitute away from higher priced imports. There is only 
limited scope to increase production to take advantage of higher export prices. Without considering 
linkages with other sectors, it would seem the GCC countries would fair better with a modest rather 
than ambitious Doha outcome in agriculture. 
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Table 11 Potential impacts on GCC agricultural import costs 
Commodity 




  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
             
Livestock  -0.11  -0.48  -4.15  -0.26  -9.99  -2.98 
Bovine meat  0.08  -0.03  0.24  0.13  1.70  0.32 
Sheepmeat  -0.87  -3.30  -3.89  -0.22  -9.27  -2.02 
Pigmeat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Poultry  -0.13  -0.08  -0.75  -0.62  11.19  -2.97 
Milk, conc.  0.07  0.27  0.04  0.06  3.08  0.57 
Butter  0.04  0.21  0.22  0.05  1.82  1.08 
Cheese  0.31  1.23  0.61  0.42  13.07  7.72 
Hides & skins  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04  0.15 
Wheat  9.31  0.21  6.36  2.43  -15.77  1.22 
Rice  0.10  0.50  0.36  0.20  3.13  1.66 
Barley  0.00  0.16  0.04  0.04  13.79  0.45 
Maize  0.00  0.22  0.09  0.02  8.97  2.01 
Sorghum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
Sugar, raw  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sugar, refined  0.16  1.60  1.17  0.16  3.12  26.64 
Coffee, green  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Coffee, proc.  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.16  0.17  0.53 
Cocoa beans  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cocoa, proc.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.05 
Tobacco leaves  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.61 
Tobacco, proc.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oilseeds, temp.  0.02  0.02  0.08  0.01  0.29  3.53 
Oilseeds, trop.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.05 
Vegetable oils  0.04  0.23  0.46  0.06  1.07  2.30 
Pulses  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.26  0.72 
Tomatoes  0.06  -0.72  -0.87  0.03  -9.63  -3.94 
Roots & tubers  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.48  -0.01 
Apples  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.02  0.39  0.48 
Citrus fruits  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.02  -2.45  -0.43 
Bananas  0.00  0.00  -0.14  0.01  0.11  0.01 
Other tropical 
fruits  0.00  -0.20  -4.06  -0.02  -0.02  -0.17 
Tea  0.02  0.01  0.24  0.04  0.48  1.24 
Rubber  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cotton  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.08 
Total  9.34  -0.03  -3.84  2.80  15.12  38.93 
Source: ATPSM simulations. These estimates include trade within the GCC region. 
 
5. Estimating potential impacts of the WTO proposals on industrial tariffs 
Three NAMA scenarios are detailed in table 12. Scenarios 2 to 4 have different coefficients, 25, 22 
and 20, for the Swiss coefficient for developing countries. Associated with the different coefficients 
are  varying  levels  of  exemptions.  The  restrictive  Swiss  coefficient  (20)  is  combined  with  high 
flexibility, where the selected (sensitive) products can cover up to 14 per cent of tariff lines that do not 
account for more than 16 per cent of imports. Those products are reduced by half of the formula cuts.   19 
A second option in combination with a coefficient of 20 is to fully exempt up to 6.5 per cent of tariff 
lines provided they do not account for more than 7.5 per cent of imports. Swiss 22 provides half cuts 
for 10 per cent of tariff lines/imports or full exemption for 5 per cent of tariff lines/imports, whereas 
Swiss 25 allows no flexibility. Sensitive products are selected according a number of filters. The first 
is the loss in tariff revenue, calculated with Swiss = 20. If the tariff revenue loss is equal or zero, the 
percentage binding overhang is  used as a criterion, with the more  sensitive having the lower the 
overhang.  Additional  filters  are  trade,  applied  tariffs  and  bound  tariffs  in  descending  order.  The 
calculated changes in bound and applied tariffs and tariff revenue losses are shown. The scenarios do 
not include sectoral elimination in the: (i) chemicals; (ii) fisheries; (iii) gas-related goods; and (iv) raw 
materials sectors.  The impacts of sectoral elimination will be examined separately. 
 
Table 12 Scenarios 
Formula  Label  Description 
2  NAMA 20  NAMA:  
Tariff cuts: Swiss formula 
Developed Swiss coefficient 8  
Developing Swiss coefficient 20 
LDCs no reductions. 
 
Bindings: 
25 percentage points above applied rate. Bind and cut. 
For developing countries with less than 15% (35%) 
bound tariffs, 75% (80%) of tariff lines to be bound at an 
average tariff of 30%. 
 
Flexibilities: not applying formula cuts for up to 14% of 
non-agricultural national tariff lines provided they do 
not exceed 16% of the total value of a developing 
Member's non-agricultural imports. 
 
Sectoral elimination: none 
 
3  NAMA 22  NAMA:  
Tariff cuts: Swiss formula 
Developed Swiss coefficient 8  
Developing Swiss coefficient 22 
LDCs no reductions. 
 
Bindings: as for NAMA 20. 
 
Flexibilities: not applying formula cuts for up to 10% of 
non-agricultural national tariff lines provided they do 
not exceed 10% of the total value of a developing 
Member's non-agricultural imports. 
 
Sectoral elimination: none 
 
4  NAMA 25  NAMA:  
Tariff cuts: Swiss formula 
Developed Swiss coefficient 8    20 
Developing Swiss coefficient 25 
LDCs no reductions. 
 








Formula tariff cuts 
These  scenarios  require  some  explanation.  For  NAMA,  a  non-linear  harmonizing  Swiss  formula 
would apply. The formula is: T1 = (ta x T0)/(ta + T0), where T1 is the final tariff, ta the maximum tariff 
(Swiss  coefficient),  and  T0  the  initial  tariff.  The  selection  of  values  for  the  coefficients  within  a 
formula approach can have a significant impact on the resulting tariff reduction obligations. Typically, 
ta is higher for developing than developed countries, but common to all countries within the group. 
This implies that developing countries undertake lesser reductions for a given tariff of e.g. 100 per 
cent than under a common coefficient. The effect of the various coefficients on final tariffs is shown 
in figure 3 for the developed (8) and developing countries (20, 22 and 25) respectively. In the first 
instance a tariff of 100 in a developed country is reduced to 7.4 per cent. For developing countries the 
final  tariff  would  be  between  17  and  20  per  cent  depending  on  the  selected  coefficient.  Least 
developed countries undertake no tariff reductions. 
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Saudi  Arabia  does  not  have  to  make  any  tariff  cuts  since  it  is  a  very  recently  acceded  member 
(vRAM). There is a special provision for Oman, specifying that it does not have to reduce tariffs 
below  5  per  cent.  Oman  has  industrial  tariffs  averaging  11.6  per  cent.  The  specific  provision  is 
particularly useful for many of Oman's tariff lines bound at 5 and 5.5 per cent.  
 
Estimated impacts of changes in industrial tariffs 
Changes in GCC average industrial tariffs under the three NAMA proposals are shown in table 13. 
The initial tariffs are included as a comparison. For Bahrain, the initial average tariff of 33.6 per cent 
is reduced to 12.9 per cent under the more ambitious NAMA 20, 13.5 per cent under NAMA 22 and 
so on. While the harmonising effect, with larger tariffs being reduced by proportionately more, is 
plain to see, it is also clear that there is little difference between the three scenarios. 
 
Table 13 Bound tariffs. Initial and final industrial tariffs  
  Initial  NAMA 20  NAMA 22  NAMA 25 
  %  %  %  % 
Region         
Bahrain  33.6  12.9  13.5  13.8 
Kuwait  100.0  20.8  22.1  20.0 
Oman  11.6  6.7  6.9  7.2 
Qatar  14.5  8.7  9.0  9.5 
Saudi Arabia  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5 
United Arab Emirates  13.1  8.1  8.4  8.8 
Source: WITS and simulations. As a very recently acceded member, Saudi Arabia is not required to undertake 
cuts in tariffs. 
 
While the ambitious Swiss formula considerably reduces the scope to apply higher rates in future, in 
terms of economic impact of more immediate interest is the change in applied tariffs. These calculated 
changes are shown in table 14. It is clear that the changes in bound rates have almost no impact on the 
average applied rates. For Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the changes are imperceptible. 
Of course, this only applies to averages.  
 
Table 14 Applied tariffs. Initial and final industrial tariffs 
  Initial  NAMA 20  NAMA 22  NAMA 25 
  %  %  %  % 
Region         
Bahrain  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8 
Kuwait  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5 
Oman  4.2  4.1  4.2  4.1 
Qatar  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8 
Saudi Arabia  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
United Arab Emirates  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.6 
Source: WITS and simulations. Tariffs are trade weighted. 
 
Table 15 shows the number of tariff lines affected and the implicit loss in revenue, assuming each 
country chooses the option that maximizes its tariff revenue, and no change in world prices or the   22 
quantity of imports. The proposed changes have no affect on any applied tariffs in Bahrain or Kuwait. 
Applied tariffs in Oman and Saudi Arabia are not affected due to the special provisions for these 
countries not to reduce bound tariffs below 5 per cent or to not reduce any tariffs, respectively. In 
Qatar and United Arab Emirates exactly the same 403 tariff lines of the CET are affected, a small 
share, 6.74 per cent, of the 5,979 industrial tariff lines. These are all products where the bound rate is 
5.5 or 5 per cent and the corresponding applied rate is 5 per cent. None of the three options allows 
Qatar and United Arab Emirates to completely avoid any affect on applied rates. For example, one 
option is to apply a Swiss coefficient of 20 and exclude 6.5 per cent of tariff lines that do not account 
for more than 7.5 per cent of imports from any cuts. In that case other tariff lines that are bound at 6.5 
per cent would bite into applied rates. 
 
The number of affected tariff lines in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates would be minimized by 
choosing a Swiss coefficient of 22 and leaving 5 per cent of tariff lines, not accounting for more than 
5 per cent of their imports, unchanged. In this case the number of affected lines could be reduced to 
106. Cuts in these remaining affected lines would be, however, deeper than in the scenario where 10 
per cent of lines receive half of the normal cuts. The products that could be exempt from any cuts 
could be selected from the attached list of affected tariff lines (under the option Swiss 22 with half of 
the normal cuts for 10 per cent of tariff lines) if the objective is to minimize the number of affected 
CET tariff lines. One product (HS 284210) is bound at 6 per cent in the United Arab Emirates and 
would have to be added to the list. This product would not be affected with half of the normal cuts but 
would be with full cuts. The difference of the average new bound rate between the options of half of 
the cuts for 10 per cent or no cuts for 5 per cent of the tariff lines is small. The new average with full 
exemption of 5 per cent is slightly lower than under the other  half-cut option.  In Qatar the  new 
average would be 8.53 per cent instead of 9.0 per cent and in the United Arab Emirates 8.09 instead of 
8.4. The additional condition that the 5 per cent of tariff lines must not account for more than 5 per 
cent of imports is not restricting the choice of products, based on UN Comtrade trade data for Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Therefore, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, would have to consider advantages and disadvantages 
of the two discussed options: one in which 404 tariff lines are affected and where the applied rate is 
reduced from 5 per cent to 4.95 per cent in the majority of these cases (see attachment) or in which 
106 tariff lines are affected and reduced from 5 per cent to at least 4.4 per cent. Thus, there is a trade-
off between width and depth of cut. 
 
The change in tariff revenue is a small share of the respective totals, less than 1 per cent in both cases. 
Across the industrial sector as a whole, the impact of the proposed tariff changes is slight. A listing of 
the affected lines for Qatar and United Arab Emirates is provided in an attachment to this document.   23 
The most affected lines, at least as far as tariff revenue losses are concerned, include aircraft and parts 
thereof (HS8803) followed by inorganic chemicals (HS2804).
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Table 15 Tariff revenue-maximizing option, and tariff revenue effects 















    %  No.  $m  $m 
Region           
Bahrain  Swiss 25  4.8  0  1,340  0 
Kuwait  Swiss 25  4.5  0  450  0 
Oman  Swiss 22, 10% 
half cuts  4.2  0  200  0 
Qatar  Swiss 22, 10% 
half cuts  4.8  403  1,010  -1 
Saudi Arabia  n.a.   4.0  0  8,190  0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Swiss 22, 10% 
half cuts  3.7  403  2,750  -2 
Source: Simulations.  Change in tariff revenue is calculated assuming no change in imports or prices. 
 
Sectoral elimination  
The sectoral issue became more and more important in the NAMA negotiations. For the United States 
and other mainly developed counties the real commercial value of the formula reduction is seen low 
and for political support of a Doha agreement they seem to need participation of emerging economies 
such  as  China,  Brazil  and  India  in  some  important  sectorals.  The  latter  and  others  stress  that 
participation  should  be  non-mandatory,  as  agreed  in  the  Hong  Kong  Ministerial.  There  is  also 
uncertainty  regarding  the  critical  mass.  Commitments  may  only  come  into  force  when  countries 
accounting for a critical mass of world trade participate, mostly proposed to be 90 per cent.  
 
Uncertainty also exists with respect to special and differential treatment for participating developing 
countries.  Different  approaches  such  as  linking  participation  to  the  Swiss  coefficient  have  been 
suggested. Some sector specific proposals suggest partial liberalisation, with tariffs not being reduced 
to zero, or only involving a selection of countries. Because of the multitude of potential scenarios, two 
extreme case are reported here. One in which all developed and developing countries participate and 
eliminate tariffs on the corresponding products and one in which only the EU, Japan and the United 
states participate and eliminate tariffs. This illustrates the importance to GCC exports of involving 
developing as well as developed countries in tariff reductions. 
 
                                                         
13 These ranking are somewhat arbitrary. A different aggregation, for example at the six digit level, may provide 
different results.   24 
Proposals on sectorals 




Special and Differential Treatment for DCs 
Chemicals  90  Elimination   Longer implementation period; bind 4% of lines at 
4% OR extended impl. period for 5% of lines  
Fish  90  Elimination  Longer implementation period; bind 15% of lines at 
5%, bind one 6-digit sub-heading at 10%  
Raw 
Materials 
90  Elimination  Not specified 
 Source: NAMA Draft Modalities Text, WTO (2008b); Note: Figures are mostly in brackets in the draft. Gas-
related goods sectoral is not included in the NAMA text. 
 
The proposals for sectoral elimination have a greater impact because they may require the removal of 
bound  and  hence  applied  tariffs  in  particular  sectors.
14  Although predominantly exporters, GCC 
countries have relatively high bound tariffs in the four sectors of interest, as shown in table 1 6, with 
chemicals a possible exception. A listing of the HS codes for products in each  of the four sectors is 
found in an attachment.
15  Chemicals cover fertilizer and plastics,  made from oil-based products. 
Gases are by-products of oil production, and related equipment such as gas turbines (pumps) . Raw 
materials include  oil-based products plus ores, minerals and base metals.  As with other industrial 
products, applied rates are much lower. In fact, under the NAMA proposals, without sectoral 
elimination, the applied rates in these sectors are hardly changed. This is shown in the third part of 
table 16. With sectoral elimination, the applied tariffs would go to zero. Nonetheless, with initial 
applied tariffs so low, GCC countries are unlikely to be concerned with a flood of imports. 
 
Table 16 GCC tariffs in selected sectors 
  Raw 
materials 
Fish  Gas-related 
goods 
Chemicals 
  %  %  %  % 
Simple average initial bound tariff       
Bahrain  32  28  31  31 
Kuwait  100  100  100  100 
Oman  16  19  17  5 
Qatar  17  15  13  8 
Saudi Arabia  12  10  9  5 
United Arab Emirates  15  15  13  7 




     
                                                         
14 It is no presumption that these proposals will be successfully negotiated within the Doha Round and 
subsequently implemented. In particular, there is significant uncertainty relating the chemicals sector. The 
sectoral initiative for gas-related goods is not included in the 14 sectors covered in Annex 6 of the NAMA draft 
modalities text, WTO (2008b). It was submitted by Qatar to the Committee on Trade and Environment in 
Special Session and the Negotiating Group on Market Access. The name „gas-related goods‟ and the selection of 
goods is based on the submission of Qatar (TN/TE/W/27 and TN/MA/W/33). Corresponding tariffs in other 
countries had to be specified at the HS 6-digit level. 
15 GCC_FourSectorCodes.xls.   25 
Simple average initial applied tariff 
Bahrain  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Kuwait  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Oman  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Qatar  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Saudi Arabia  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
United Arab Emirates  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
         
Simple average final applied tariffs without sectoral elimination   
Bahrain  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Kuwait  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Oman  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
Qatar  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.4 
Saudi Arabia  4.9  3.2  5.0  4.5 
United Arab Emirates  4.9  3.3  5.0  4.4 
Source: WITS and simulations. 
 
The initial tariffs facing GCC exporters in the selected sectors are shown in table 17. The bound 
tariffs are generally more than twice the applied tariffs. The final column shows the tariff revenue 
collected on GCC exports in these sectors. The removal of these tariffs would transfer this revenue to 
consumers in importing countries, but some of the gain would be captured by exporters, depending on 
the elasticity of demand. Note that the trade weighted applied tariffs are much lower than the simple 
average bound. Thus the potential gains from sectoral elimination are not as great as the bound tariffs 
would suggest.  
 
Table 17 Initial tariffs facing GCC exports prior to sectoral elimination 














Exports  Imputed 
tariff 
revenue 
  %  %  %  %  $m  $m 
             
Chemicals  21.88  7.63  12.38  4.27  22669  968 
Fish  20.72  13.21  13.37  6.08  292  18 
Gas-related goods  13.67  3.22  3.17  1.49  33144  494 
Raw materials  17.80  4.60  7.27  1.39  353969  4920 
Source: Simulations. 
 
To quantify the potential impacts of sectoral elimination on GCC countries, we use a comparative 
static,  deterministic,  bilateral  trade  modelling  framework,  GSIM.
16  The data required are annual 
                                                         
16 Details of the modelling framework, which contains no data, can be found in the appendix.  
16 GSIM was 
developed by Joseph Francois of the Tinbergen Institute and H. Keith Hall of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission. The model is documented in a memo by these authors entitled „Global Simulation Analysis of 
Industry-Level Trade Policy‟, October 2002. See also Francois, J.F. and H.K. Hall, “Partial Equilibrium 
Modeling,” in J.F. Francois and K. Reinert, eds., Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997. A more recent non-linear version is used here. This is detailed 
in Francois (2007).   26 
bilateral  tariffs  and  trade  flows  and  elasticities  of  demand,  supply  and  the  substitution  between 
imports  of different  sources,  the  so-called  Armington  elasticity.  For  this  application  the  world  is 
divided into eleven regions, six GCC countries plus the European Union, the United States, Japan, 
China and Rest of World (RoW). GSIM is a single sector model with no cross-elasticities or linkages 
to upstream or downstream sectors. To assess the impact of a policy change we specify the removal of 
bilateral tariffs in each sector individually, and simulate the model to find a new set of market clearing 
prices. Comparing the initial and final outcomes provides an indication of the likely impacts. The 
bilateral  trade  and  tariffs  data,  obtained  from  UNCTAD  TRAINS  via  WITS,  are  shown  in  an 
attachment.  The  demand  and  Armington  elasticities  were  obtained  from  the  well-known  GTAP 
database where available.
17 The supply elasticity was set at 0.5 across the board.
18  Outputs shown 
here include producer and consumer surplus, government revenue and sectoral welfare in each 
country. The trade, tariff revenue and welfare estimates are shown in table 18.  
 
GCC countries as a group are estimated to experience trade and welfare gains from the elimination of 
tariffs in the four sectors collectively . Because tariffs on imports are eliminated, tariff revenue is 
reduced to zero.  Tariff revenue losses for the GCC countries amount to $ 914 million in the four 
sectors. The bulk of the  welfare gains accrue in the  gas-related goods and raw materials sectors, on 
which GCC countries  face varying tariffs in developing countries . This implies that t he gains to 
exporters, shown as  export revenue in table 18, outweigh the losses to consumers  (not shown) and 
taxpayers. The main effects are distributional, with large transfer between taxpayers and consumers. 
(These may be the same people.) The net welfare effects are less significant by comparison.  
 
Saudi Arabia is a significant beneficiary of sectoral elimination in the chemicals and  gas-related 
goods sectors. This is driven by the removal of EU  and RoW tariffs on chemicals and  gas-related 
goods. Kuwait also gains in the  gas-related goods market from the removal of RoW tariffs. Qatar 
benefits from the removal of tariffs on  Gas exports to China and the RoW, even though these tariffs 
are already quite low, 3.3 and 2.8 per cent respectively. The major marke ts for the  United Arab 
Emirates are Japan and RoW for Gas and raw materials. Japanese tariffs on these items are already at 
zero, with no scope for further gains, but RoW tariffs average 4.2 per cent for  gas-related goods. 
Oman benefits from  gas-related goods and raw materials exports to RoW , in which it faces tariffs 
from 2.9 and 5.6 per cent respectively. Tariffs in a major market, Japan, are as low as they can go. 
Finally, among the GCC, Bahrain also exports  gas to China, the United States and the RoW, w here 
                                                         
17 Demand elasticities are available for the EU25, USA, Japan and China, although the correspondence with 
GTAP sectors is not perfect. There are no GCC countries in the GTAP database. A demand elasticity of -0.25 
was applied to these countries and to the Rest of World. This approximation is not important for gas-related 
goods and raw materials, where GCC countries export to the developed countries, but is more important for 
chemicals and fish where GCC countries are net importers. 
18 I would be desirable use country and sector specific estimates of supply elasticities, but the absence of such 
data precludes this.    27 
tariffs of 6.4, 2.8 and 2.7 per cent are eliminated. Bahrain loses in the chemicals sector, where it 
competes with China in the US market. 
 
Table 18 Impact of elimination of sectoral tariffs 








  %  $m  $m  $m 
Chemicals         
Bahrain  1.31  5  -12  -4 
China  4.51  4,077  -7,078  507 
Japan  3.90  3,230  -796  1,120 
Kuwait  5.40  67  -30  21 
Oman  2.43  20  -24  -9 
Qatar  3.61  71  -22  32 
Saudi Arabia  2.61  494  -237  162 
United Arab Emirates  3.61  90  -251  -77 
United States  2.77  5,008  -2,566  -217 
EU25  3.23  10,973  -2,891  4,109 
RoW  2.27  9,005  -17,079  -5,603 
         
GCC  2.89  747  -576  124 
         
Fish         
Bahrain  9.68  2  0  1 
China  6.88  660  -353  294 
Japan  6.22  94  -510  -373 
Kuwait  -0.92  0  -1  -2 
Oman  6.80  8  -1  4 
Qatar  0.23  0  0  0 
Saudi Arabia  9.40  7  -7  -2 
United Arab Emirates  2.22  3  -2  -2 
United States  5.95  281  -129  -247 
EU25  14.44  658  -966  -190 
RoW  3.78  2292  -1779  531 
         
GCC  5.55  20  -11  -1 
         
Gas-related goods         
Bahrain  3.27  63  -1  42 
China  2.48  198  -1201  -73 
Japan  1.82  130  -184  -547 
Kuwait  5.32  661  -15  431 
Oman  2.33  110  -16  61 
Qatar  1.71  237  -6  157 
Saudi Arabia  3.43  610  -52  392 
United Arab Emirates  3.24  519  -15  337 
United States  1.54  363  -2037  -1118 
EU25  5.40  2558  -400  766 
RoW  0.96  3522  -4395  -225 
         
GCC  3.30  2201  -106  1419 
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Raw materials         
Bahrain  -0.56  -2  -4  -1 
China  2.28  410  -469  -83 
Japan  4.42  319  -8  -198 
Kuwait  0.31  6  -4  25 
Oman  9.00  451  -12  19 
Qatar  -0.09  -11  -8  17 
Saudi Arabia  0.42  40  -71  84 
United Arab Emirates  4.70  387  -138  18 
United States  0.00  2  -28  -102 
EU25  1.92  870  -65  -158 
RoW  0.16  662  -1119  392 
         
GCC  1.10  870  -237  161 
Source: GSIM simulations.  
 
Developing country liberalization contributes a large share of the gains in GCC exports and welfare. 
A simulation involving tariff elimination in EU, USA and Japan only reduces GCC exports revenue 
gains by half in the chemicals and fisheries sectors, and more in the other sectors. The respective 
changes are for global and developed country tariff elimination are $747 ($320) million for chemicals, 
$20 ($9) million for fish, $2201 ($405) million for gas related products and $870 ($80) million for 
raw materials. Unfortunately, the analysis doesn‟t indicate which developing countries are important, 
and whether they are WTO members.  
 
6. Harmonization of GCC bound rates 
GCC countries could harmonize their bound tariffs. One advantage could be to negotiate as one bloc, 
such as the European Union, with enhanced bargaining power. A bloc with harmonized tariffs could 
avoid situations where one country, such as Oman, negotiates a specific provision which is partly 
neutralized by commitments of other GCC members, in this case Qatar and United Arab Emirates. 
Furthermore, countries with low bound rates such as Saudi Arabia as a recently acceded member may 
in future rounds not benefit from specific provisions and may thus implicitly determine the possible 
applied rates as well as the policy space of the GCC. However, the impact of harmonization depends 
at what level new bound rates would be set. One way in which bound rates could be harmonized 
would be to take for each single product the lowest of all six country specific bound rates. For this, 
WTO members do not have to give their consent but tariffs would be bound at very low levels, 10.6 
per  cent  on  average  (see  table  19).  This  represents  a  significant  reduction  for  most  countries, 
especially Bahrain and Kuwait. A detailed list of country and product specific bound rates as well as 
minimum levels at the HS 6-digit level is attached. 
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Table  19  Average  GCC  bound  tariffs  compared  with 
harmonization at minimum level 
Country  Average 
  % 
   
Bahrain  33.07 
Kuwait  100.00 
Oman  13.71 
Qatar  15.93 
Saudi Arabia  12.04 
United Arab Emirates  14.68 
   
Average tariff at 
minimum per tariff line  10.60 
Source: Authors‟ calculation based on WTI/ITC/UNCTAD World 
Tariff Profile data. 
 
Binding all tariffs at the lowest level has the disadvantage that countries cannot make full use of the 
often existing exemptions where some tariffs receive lower cuts. If harmonization occurs at other than 
the minimum level, some bound tariffs would need to be raised. This requires consent of other WTO 
members. Bound tariffs can be renegotiated under GATT Article 28: Modification of Schedules. If a 
bound rate on a product in one country is increased, affected countries, i.e. suppliers of that product, 
need to be compensated by reducing other bound rates, i.e. not in monetary terms. However, the 
negotiations  at  the  General  Council  on  increasing  bound  rates  are  said  to  be  difficult,  although 
precedents exist. Countries having initial negotiating rights (INR) and principal suppliers, that is, a 9 
per cent market share, need to be compensated, according to the following guidelines. 
 
"In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for compensatory 
adjustment with respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall 
endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions 
not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such 
negotiations." 
 
A critical question is whether compensation would have to be undertaken at the national level or 
collectively in which case countries with low bound rates may benefit from other GCC countries 
reducing their higher rates.   
 
7. Implications for governments and the private sector 
Trade liberalization is a two-edged sword. Most commonly, there are global gains, but individual 
countries and sectors may experience a fall in output, exports and welfare. In addition, even if applied 
rates are not affected, the flexibility to increase tariffs if considered necessary is reduced or lost. Even 
where there are national gains, there are inevitably significant distributional effects between sectors 
and  between  producers,  consumers  and  taxpayers.  Given  these  considerations,  it  is  important  for   30 
individual countries to consider and back the most appropriate negotiating proposal. For GCC the 
remaining tariffs are very low or are on goods whose consumption is discouraged for cultural (pig 
meat) and health (tobacco) reasons. If GCC countries were obliged to reduce tariffs on these items to 
fulfill WTO commitments, they could impose a consumption tax rather than a tariff.
19 
 
In agriculture,  GCC countries are likely to be  disadvantaged  by rising world prices of imported 
products following global liberalization. However, these estimated price rises are comparatively small 
compared with normal fluctuations, between five and ten per cent.  Nevertheless, it would seem the 
GCC countries would fair better with a modest rather than ambitious Doha outcome in agriculture. 
 
In the NAMA negotiations, the choice of coefficient makes little difference, as the gap between bound 
and applied tariffs is sufficiently great. The elimination of tariffs in the selected sectors also has only a 
limited effect, as the applied tariffs facing GCC exports are already quite low. Of the four sectors, 
gas-related goods, chemicals and raw materials provide the scope for expor t gains while the fish 
sector contributes little. There are losses in tariff revenue  in all sectors. Although not specifically 
nominated for elimination of tariffs, the gas-related goods sector has the potential for significant gains 
should tariffs be reduced. This would benefit all GCC members. One caveat to note here is that the 
potential gains include additional exports to developing countries. These take a large share of GCC 
gas exports, and have tariffs that are higher than the world average. However,  not all the developing 
countries are members of the WTO, and may not therefore be obliged to reduce their tariffs following 
a WTO negotiated agreement, or would not participate in sectoral initiatives.  
 
The tariff revenue losses calculated for Saudi Arabi a would not apply if that country exercised its 
right as a RAM not to reduce tariffs in further. However, if GCC countries want to maintain common 
external tariffs on those products covered by a sectoral  agreement, losses would occur in all GCC 
countries if one or more members want to participate. A critical mass approach may also allow a free 
ride, in which case GCC countries could benefit from other countries reducing their tariffs without 
requiring GCC countries to reduce or eliminate its tariffs in corr esponding sectors. Uncertainty with 
respect to sectorals in the negotiations is high. 
 
The Swiss formula will have the effect of harmonizing bound tariffs in the GCC. Since GCC countries 
are members of a customs union, a reduction in a common external tariff in one country will require a 
similar reduction in others. This occurs because the members have diverse bound rates, with Saudi 
Arabia and Oman having low rates compared with Kuwait and Bahrain. The former countries have 
                                                         
19 These are equivalent if there is no domestic production.   31 
negotiated special provisions in this round, with Saudi Arabia not required to make tariff reductions as 
a very RAM and Oman not required to make cuts below 5 per cent, the common external tariff for the 
bulk of the NAMA items in the customs union. The remaining four countries have sufficient binding 
overhang so their applied tariffs are not affected in most cases, and hence remain above the common 
external tariff. Where tariffs are affected, the new tariff is no lower than 4 per cent, marginally lower 
than the 5 per cent on many goods. However, percentage reductions are particularly high in NAMA, 
in  the  extreme  case  of  Kuwait,  for  example,  about  80  per  cent,  much  more  than  the  percentage 
reduction in developed countries. This is the result of the harmonizing Swiss formula, which reduces 
high  tariffs  disproportionately.  The  policy  space  to  increase  applied  tariffs  if  the  trade  policy  is 
changed or, for example, to protect infant industries or to raise tariff revenue at a later stage,  is 
substantially reduced. 
 
Limitations of the analysis should be noted. Apart from the usual data issues, such as estimation of 
elasticities, there are concerns about whether the Doha implementation would occur as envisaged in 
the scenarios. Liberalization exposes an incentive to raise non-tariffs barriers, such as SPS measures 
on agricultural imports. A rise in spurious anti-dumping measures can be expected. For these reasons, 
the impacts of liberalization may be overstated. On the other hand, there are likely to be a range of 
other  non-tariff  measures  that,  if  removed,  would  lead  to  a  greater  increase  in  imports  than  the 
removal of tariff barriers considered here. In addition,  some of the policy changes simulated may 
occur in the absence of a Doha outcome. The European Union has plans to reduce its sugar support, 
and  there  are  several  regional  and  bilateral  preferential  trading  arrangements  under  discussion. 
Finally,  by  the  time  the  tariff  changes  are  implemented,  many  economies  may  have  grown  and 
changed in structure, with some sectors disappeared and replaced by others.  
 
Not included here are linkages to other sectors and factors of production, such as land, labour and 
capital. This implies the impacts are overestimated because resources lost from a declining sector are 
nor redeployed elsewhere, while an expanding sector is assumed not to attract resources out of other 
industries.  In the NAMA  analysis in particular, data limitations prevent  inclusion of intersectoral 
effects  in  the  analysis.  This  tends  to  overstate  the  impacts,  because  cross-price  elasticities  are 
generally the opposite sign of own-price elasticities. This should be kept in mind when considering 
the implications of the empirical results. Nonetheless, the results provide a good indication of the sign 
and magnitude of the likely effects, as the main determinants are the tariff changes and trade flows. 
The  modeling  results  are  best  used  for  comparing  different  scenarios  rather  than  identifying  the 
magnitude of the potential trade flows and welfare impacts. 
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Appendix GSIM  
GSIM is static, deterministic, single commodity bilateral trade model driven by export supply and 
bilateral import demand equations.
20 Exports and imports are a function of the world price plus or 
minus the relevant bilateral trade tax or subsidy. Because taxes are bilateral, and possibly different 
from country to country, the change in tariffs leads to a change in relative prices that drive differential 
changes in imports from various sources. This is essential where tariffs are reduced in some countries 
but not others. An elasticity of substitution determines the extent to which ch anges in relative prices 
lead to a switch in the source of imports. The model solves numerically to a specified tolerance using 
Excel's Solver to find a market clearing price such that global imports equals global exports. 
 
The crux of the model is the import demand equations. Import demand in country v for commodity i 
from country r is a function of prices and total expenditure on the commodity: 
(1)  M(i,v),r = f(P(i,v),r ,P(i,v),s r , Y(i,v) ) 
 
where M(i,v),r is imports, P(i,v),r internal prices,  P(i,v),s r  external prices and Y(i,v) expenditure on imports i 
in country v. 
 
The response of imports to changes in relative prices depends on an expenditure share weighted sum 
of the composite demand elasticity, Em, and the supply elasticity, Es: 
(2)  N(i,v),r,s  = θ(i,v),s (Em + Es), and  
(3)  N(i,v),r,r  = θ(i,v),r Em - Σ sr θ(i,v),sEs = θ(i,v),r Em – (1-θ(i,v),r Es). 
 
The price linkage equations relate internal prices to exports prices: 






where  T  =  (1+t),  the  power  of  the  tariff.  Quotas,  or  outright  bans,  can  be  expressed  as  a  tariff 
equivalent. On the export side, exports are a function of world prices: 




These equations are in levels. By differentiating the import, export and price equations, it is possible 
to obtain expressions for the change in imports and exports according to changes in tariffs and world 
prices: 
(6)  M´i,r   = Σ v M´ (i,v),r = Σ v N(i,v),r,r  P´ (i,v),r+ Σ v Σ sr N(i,v),r,s  P´ (i,v),s 
    = Σ v N(i,v),r,r  [P
*
r+T´ (i,v),r] + Σ v Σ sr N(i,v),r,s  [P
*´s+T´ (i,v),s]. 
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The model is solved numerically by finding a set of prices such that the change in global imports 
(equation 6) equals the change in global exports (the derivative of equation 5). 
 
Once we have solved for world prices, it is possible to work backwards to solve for export quantities 
and import quantities. Changes in government revenues are simply determined by the trade flows 
times the tariff rates. Producer and consumer surplus effects can then be determined from changes in 
prices and quantities: 
(7)  ∆PSi,r = R
0
i,r P´ i,r +0.5 R
0
i,r P´ i,r Xi,r 
where R
0
i,r is the initial export revenue.  
 
Consumer surplus is more complex because consumption is a composite of imports from different 
sources. 




 (i,v),r ) * (0.5 Em(i,v) P´ i,v
2 * sign (P´ i,v) - P´ i,v) 
 
Where P´ i,v = Σ r θ(i,v),r P
*´r + T´ (i,v),r.  
P´ i,v represents the price for composite imports, and R
0 T
0 the initial expenditure.  
 
Total welfare is the sum of producer and consumer surplus and the change in government revenue. 
 
Data required for the model are bilateral trade flows (in values), bilateral trade taxes, and elasticties of 
supply, demand and substitution between imports (the so-called Armington elasticities).  
 
Limitations of the model include the (log) linear demand and supply relationship. Linearity implies 
that  large  shocks  to  the  model  may  induce  some  errors  in  the  size  of  the  quantity  changes.  For 
example, it is reasonable to expect that as prices rise consumers become less responsive. A second 
limitation is the lack of substitution between products on the demand side, such as beef and pork. 
Empirically, the cross effects tend to be rather small, depending on how the commodities are defined. 
A  further  consideration  is  the  absence  of  upstream  and  downstream  linkages,  between  beef  and 
processed meats for example. There is no storage in the model, nor time related effects or uncertainty. 
These limitations need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
 